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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
S. \V. DOvVSE,
Plaintiff and Respoudent,

-vs.-

Case
No. 7220

DORIS TR"CST CO:JIP A~Y, a corporation,
·

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
S. W. Dowse, the plaintiff and respondent (hereinafter referred to as plaintiff) instituted this suit against
defendant and appellant above-named (hereinafter referred to as defendant) for slander of title to real property, alleging that as a result of malicious conduct on
the part of defendant in recording an instrument (hereinafter referred to as the Notice), plaintiff suffered
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$5,000.00 general damages (par. 4 of his complaint),
that he had to pay out $250.00 attorney's fee to commence and prosecute an action to quiet title because of
the filing of said Notice, and that therefore he was also
entitled to $5250.00 exemplary damages (par. 7 of complaint), and then in the prayer, asked for $250.00 paid
out to counsel to clear title and $5,000.00 exemplary
damages. (R. 1-6).
At the trial the court granted a motion for a directed verdict (R. 108) and directed a verdict in favor of
the plaintiff for $250.00 (R. 113-115 ), the amount alleged
to have been paid for attorney's fee, and submitted the
amount of punitive damages to the jury. The jury then
brought in its verdict in which it found the issues in
favor of plaintiff and against defendant, as directed,
and assessed his damages in the sum of $250.00 compensatory and $500.00 exemplary damages, or a total of
$750.00 (R. 40-A); and judgment on the verdict was
entered April 16, 1948. (R. 41).
\Vithin the time allowed by order of the court, defendant's bill of exceptions herein was served and
settled, defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's complaint,
all exhibits or portions of exhibits received in evidence,
the minute entries and entries in the Register of Action,
and orders and proceedings of the court being incorporated therein and made a part thereof. (R. 122). Defendant's notice of appeal was served and filed June 26,
1948 (R. 45 ), and cost bond and stay bond filed herein.
(R. 46).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
The action grew out of a former suit, No. 76,888 in
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake
County, etah, in which the court entered judgment quieting title in plaintiff, and granting defendant $1047.50.
Xo eosts were allowed either party. In the fonner action, the court set out in its findings that there was an
oral agreement between plaintiff and defendant for the
~ale to defendant of the property involved in the action; that the defendant had paid $1,000.00 on the purchase price thereof; that the full agreement was not reduced to writing, nor sufficient 1nemorandum made, and
' hence was null and void, and no part eYer carried out
except the payment of the $1000.00 (R. 11-12).

~ As to the Pleadings:
In his complaint herein, plaintiff alleged that on
July 18, 1945, he acquired title to certain lots in Salt
Lake County, Utah, described as Lots 1 to 11, Fox's
~ Subdivision of Lot 2, Block 23, Five Acre Plat "A",
1 Big Field SnlTey, from the Salt Lake Valley Loan &
p, Trust Company; and on the 9th day of August, 1945,
the defendant falsely and maliciously and with intent
to encumber and cloud plaintiff's title, and to harass
and vex him in the quiet enjoyment thereof, caused to
be recorded in the office of the County Recorder of Salt
Lake County, Utah, an instrument (hereinafter referred
to as the Notice), of which the following is a copy:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Doris Trust' Company,
1430 South Main Street,
Salt Lake City, Utah, Aug. 9, 1945
NOTICE

To whom it may concern: That certain property described as : All of Lots one to eleven in
Fox's Subdivision, an addition to Salt Lake City,
Utah-was purchased for Doris Trust Company
by S. W. Dowse, as their agent. That One Thousand Dollars has been paid toward the purchase
price and that the balance, plus a reasonable
commission will be paid on demand on delivery
of deed.
(Signed) Addison Cain,
President, Doris Trust Co.
State of Utah
County of Salt Lake

SS.

Addison Cain, being first duly sworn, did say
that he is President of Doris Trust Companyhas full knowledge of the within statement and
that the same is true of his own knowledge.
(Signed) L. B. Cardon, Notary Public

(Seal) My commission expires May 26, 1948."
(Recorded at request of Addison Cain, Aug. 9,
1945 at 2:50 M. fee paid $.50.
Cornelia S. Lund, Recorder, Salt Lake . ,
County, Utah
(Signed) Cornelia S. Lund
(R. 2)
Plaintiff then set out, par. 4 (R. 2) in his complaint,
"That the claim set forth in said instrument
which was duly recorded as hereinabove set forth
was false and without right whatever, and deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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fendant at time of recording said instrument as
hereinabove set forth, had no estate, right, title
or interest whateYer in or to or upon said land
or premises, or any part thereof; that the recording of said notice cast a cloud upon and a slander
upon plaintiff's title to said property decreasing
the value of said real estate and making it unmarketable all to the damage of said real estate
and said plaintiff in the sum of Five Thousand
($5,000.00) Dollars." (R. 2).
And further, par. 5, (R. 3), ·' ... that plaintiff was
required to engage counsel and pay said counsel the
sum of $250.00 to commence and prosecute an action to
quiet the title to his said lands in order that he might
remove the apparent cloud upon his title and make said
title to said land marketable; . . . ''
A copy of Decree and Judgment was attached to
the complaint and made a part thereof. (R. 1-6).
Defendant filed a general and a special demurrer
(R. 7) to the complaint, and on :.May 7, 1947, the demurrer was overruled (R. 9), and defendant given ten days
to file an answer; that defendant filed its answer (R.
10-12), admitting filing the Notice mentioned, alleging
that it had paid plaintiff the $1,000.00 referred to in said
Notice on the purchase price of the lots described
therein; admitted judgment entered in the prior case,
as shown by plaintiff's Exhibit "A" (R. 5, 6) in his
complaint, and alleging that the said judgment was
based on findings of fact and conclusions of law in said
prior case, a copy of which was set out in defendant's
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answer; and denying each and every other allegation.
(R. 10-12).
No reply was filed.
STATEMENT OF ERRORS RELIED UPON
Defendant relies on the following errors for a reversal of the judgment appealed from:
1. The court erred in overruling plantiff's general
demurrer. (R. 9).

2. The court erred in overruling plaintiff's special
demurrer. ( R. 9).
3. The court erred in denying defendant's motion
for dismissal of the complaint. (R. 50, 52).
4. The court erred in overruling defendant's objection to testimony. (R. 50, 52).
5. The court erred in admitting in evidence plaintiff's Exhibit C. (R. 80, 81).
(This exhibit was later changed to C-1 and C-2, R.
117).
6. The court erred in refusing defendant's motion
for a directed verdict. (R. 107).
7. The court erred in granting plaintiff's motion
for a directed verdict. (R. 106, 108).
8. The court erred in submitting the question of
amount of exemplary damages to the jury. (R. 113).

I
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9. The court erred with respect to each portion of
Instruction No. 1 as given to the jury ( R. 113-114) and
to which defendant noted an exception. (R. 117).
10. The court erred in failing to charge the jury
as set forth in each of defendant's requested instructions Nos. 1 to 5, inclusiYe. (R. 35-39).
A statement and argurnents upon the particular
questions pertinent to the claimed errors specified are
below set forth under numbered POINTS. Such statement and argument with respect to any error relied
upon appear below under the POINT bearing the same
number as that given the above paragraph specifying
that error.
STATE~IE~T

AND ARGU~MENTS UPON THE
PARTICULAR QUESTIONS INVOLVED FOR
DETERMINATIO~

POINT 1.
THE CouRT ERRED IN OvERRULING PLAINTIFF's
GENERAL DEMURRER.

Slander of title is a false and malicious statement, oral or written, made in disparagement of
a person's title to real or personal property,
causing him special damages, and the essential
elements ·are uttering and publishing of slanderous words, falsity of words, malice, and special
damages.--Cawse v. Signal Oil Co., 103 P. 2d 729;
129 ALR 174 (Ore.).
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Slander of title is a false and malicious statement, oral or written, made in disparagement of
a person's title to real or personal property,
causing him special damage, and is not an action
for defamation of character of the person, and
is therefore distinguishable from ordinary libel
or slander.-Woodward v. Pacific Fruit & Produce
Co., 106 P 2d 1043; 131 ALR 832 (Ore.).
To maintain an action for slander of title, it
must appear that the words complained of were
false, that they were maliciously spoken, and resulted in pecuniary injury to plaintiff.-Potsi
Zinc Co. v. Mahoney, 135 P. 1078, 36 Nev. 390.
Plaintiff in an action for slander of title, must
prove utterance and publishing of slanderous
words, falsity thereof, malice, special damages,
and interest in property slandered.-Rittenhouse
v. Johnson, 17 P 2d 457, 161 Okl. 169.
From the foregoing ''general definitions'', and
cases hereinafter cited, it would appear that the essential elements of an action for slander of title, which
plaintiff must allege and prove, are:
(A)

Uttering and publishing of slanderous word::;;

(B)

The falsity thereof;

(C)

Maliciously 1nade or spoken ;

(D) Disparaging plaintiff's title and resulting in
special damages.
Defendant asserts that plaintiff's complaint does
not set out the above-mentioned essential elements; and
asserts further, not only does it not set out the abo\'•'Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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mentioned P~~t'll tial element8, but that it does not sd
out any one of them.
~\s special damagPs seem to be the gist of an action
for slander of title of property, without ·which the actioH
could not be maintained, the ''utterance of mere falsehood alone not being sufficient." ( lV ard v. Gee, '61 S'V
2d 555), that phase of the complaint will be discussed
first.
(D)

any

Special Damages

The complaint does not allege that plaintiff snffereu
special damages, and hence is fatally defective.
In an action for slander of title to property,
plaintiff must plead special damages.-W ittntan
Bros. v. Witteman Co., 151 N.Y. Sup. 813.
A complaint for slander of title must not only
allege that the statement complained of was false
and published maliciously, but that pecuniary
damage resulted by reason thereof.-Felt v. Germania Life Ins. Co., 133 N.Y. Sup. 519.

Plaintiff in an action for slander of title must
allege and prove special damages, and it is not
enough merely to allege generally that he intended
to sell to any person who might buy, but he must
allege and prove loss of sale to some particular
person.-Hubbard v. Scott, 166 P. 33, 85 Ore. 1.
Defendant filing counter claim for slander of
title must plead and prove special damages.Farmers State Bank of Harris, Iowa v. Hintz,
221 N.W. 540, 206 Iowa 911.
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Words spoken or written regarding property
or title are not actionable per se, but special
damages must be shown.-Briggs v. Coykendall,
224 N.W. 202, 57 N. D. 785.
A counterclaim pleading no special damages
states no cause of action for slander of titleSeeck & Kade v. Pertussin Chemical Co., 256
N.Y.S. 567, 235 App. Div. 251.
Recovery of damages for slander of title required proof that pending sale to named prospective purchaser was defea.ted.-H oust on Chronicle
Pub. Co. v. Martin, 5 SW 2d 170.
The rule requiring the complaint to allege
special damages is well settled. Necessary to
allege a. loss of sale to some particular person or
give the name of the prospective purchaserBurkett v. Griffith, 27 P. 527.
An action for slander of title is not one for
words spoken, but for special damages for losses
sustained by reason of the speaking and publication of the slander of plaintiff's title.-Hardin
Oil Co. v. Spencer, 266 SW 654, 205 Ky. 842.
In an action for slander of title, only special
damages can be recovered, and such damages
must be particularly pleaded.-Cronkhite v.
Chaplin, 282 Fed. 579 (U. S. C. C. A. Okla.).
Special damages of a. pecuniary nature is the
gist of the action for slander of title, and such
damages must be directly or particularly set out
in the complaint; a. general allegation of loss
being insu:fficient.-Dent v. Balch, 104 S. 651, 213
Ala. 311.
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'l1o establish action for slander of title, word~
complained of must be false and 1naliciously
spoken with reference to pending sale or purchase
of property, and they must result in pecuniary
loss or injury to party complaining and slander
must be such as goes to defeat plaintiff's title.Lee v. Jlaggard, 85 P. 2d 654, 197 "\Yash. 380.
~o allegation is made in the cmnplaint that a pending sale was defeated. nor has an:· prospective purchaser
heen named, nor has any alleged damage been distinctly
or particularly set out, or injury suffered by reason of
loss of any surh prospective sale.

In paragraph 5 of plaintiff's complaint appears the
following (R. 3):
'' . . . that plaintiff was required to engage
counsel and pay said counsel the sum of $250.00
to comn1ence and prosecute an action to quiet the
title to said lands in order that he might remove
the apparent cloud upon his title and make said
title to said land marketable ... "
No allegation is set out as to whom such payment
was made, or when, or whether the amount was reasonahle for such service.
Defendant asserts that attorney's fees are not recoverable as damages in an action for slander of title.
In the case of llfcGuinness v. Hargiss (56 "\Vash. 162,
105 P. 233), respondent charged appellant "·ith slandering their title to real estate, and sought damages and
the removal from the record of the offending instrument
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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as a cloud upon their title. The claim for damages was
general, with the exception of a special plea for attorney's fee. The court below made findings in favor of
respondents, holding the recorded writing to be a slander and cloud upon respondents' title and awarding
damages in the sum of $350.00, and the case \Yas brought
to the Supreme Court on appeal. That court stated that
there were only two questions involved: one, as to an
existing contract; and the other, the question, are the
respondents, upon the pleading and proofs, entitled to
damagef:. In deciding the second question, the court held
that the lower court erred, holding,
'' ... that in an action for slander of title it is
the recognized rule that only special damages
must be pleaded and proved. There was no plea
nor proof of special damages, except the claim
for attorney's fee for the prosecution of the action. We have unif9rmly held that in this state
attorney's fee, either as damages or cost, other
than statutory, are not recoverable.''
Other cases to the same effect :
Attorney's fees are not recoverable as damages in slander of title or jactitation suit.-City
of Shreveport v. Kahn, 193 So. 461, 194, La. 55.
Expenses of a suit to establish title cannot
be recovered.-Cohen v. Minzescheimer, 118 N.
Y. S. 383.
In an action by option holder for slander of
their title by statement that the option had terminated, plaintiffs could not recover attorney's
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fees in defense of prior suit by owner to forfeit
option.-Hubbard v. Scott, 166 Pac. 33, 85 Or. 1.
Lessors suing lessees for defamation of title
following refusal to cancel lease of record following forfeiture, could not recover attorney's
fees; attorney's fees not being recoverable in an
action for defamation of title.-Barquin v. H aU
Oil Co., 201 P. 352, 28 Wyo. 164.
In the last mentioned case, the court further held:
''Defamation of title of property was not considered harmful at common law and not actionable unless special damages were shown. And
since these special damages are the gist and
heart of the action, a peculiar strictness governs
in respect to the pleadings and evidence. As was
said in Griffin vs. Isbell, 17 Ala. 186: 'There is
perhaps no other civil action which has been
treated so strictly by the courts.' Hence the
special damages must be specially pointed out or
the petition is demurrable.''
(A)

Uttering and Publishing of Slanderott·S Words.

Plaintiff alleges in his complaint, par. 3 (R. 1), that
the defendant
"
. caused to be recorded in the office of
the County Recorder of Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, the following ... "
(referring to the Notice above mentioned); and after
setting out the Notice in the complaint, in par. 4 (R. 2),
also alleges :
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"That ... the instrument was duly recorded
... that the recording of said notice cast a cloud
upon and a slander upon plaintiff's title ... "
In other words, plaintiff claims that the recordingof the instrument was the thing that cast a cloud and
a slander upon plaintiff's title; nothing else being relied
upon so far as "publishing" and "uttering" is concerned. There is no allegation that anyone saw it or
was influenced by it.
By virtue of Section 78-3-2, 1943 Utah Code Annotated,
''Every conveyance, or instrument in writing
affecting real estate executed, acknowledged or
proved, and certified, in the manner prescribed
by this title, ... shall, from the time of filing the
same with the recorder of record, impart notice
to all persons of the contents thereof ... "
And Section 78-2-6 of the said Code provides that,
''The certificate of acknowledgement of an
instrument by a corporation must be substantially in the following form:
'State of Utah, County of Salt Lake.
On the ........ day of ........................ personally
appeared before me-------------·-························-, who
being by me duly sworn (or affirmed) did say
that he is the president (or other officer or
agent, as the case may be) of (naming corporation), and that said instrument was signed
in behalf of said corporation by authority of
its by-laws (or of a resolution of its board of
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directors, as the case may be), and said ---------------·-·-··-·······-··-acknowledged to nw that said corporation executed the same.' ''
The acknowledgement shown in the Notice set out
in par. 3 of plaintiff's co1nplaint (R. 2) is not in substantial form or compliance as required by the statute
above referred to, and the ~ otice was not entitled to
be recorded, and therefore not published. ''Since notice
from a record is a creature of statute, the statute giving
it such effect must be complied with." Doris Trust Co.
v. Quermbach et al, 103 Utah 120,127. The entry on the
record of an instrument which is not entitled by the
statute to be recorded is not legally a record and did
not give ... constructive notice of its contents. lb. p. 128.
Since the sole act of publishing or uttering was the
recording of the instrument, as alleged in the complaint,
and relied upon as the act of slander of title, defendant
asserts there was no publishing, as shown on the face
of the complaint.
(B)

Falsity of the Words.

The complaint does not deny the falsity of the
words.
To maintain an action for slander of title, it
must appear that the words complained of were
false.-Potsi Zinc Co. v. Mahoney, 135 P. 1078,
36 Nev. 390.
To establish action for slander of title, words
complained of must be false.- Lee v. Maggard,
85 P 2d. 654, 197 Wash. 380.
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The complaint in an action for slander of title
must allege the uttering and publishing of the
slanderous words, as well as the falsity and maliciousness of the statement.-Stovall v. Texas Co.,
Tex. Civ. App. 262 SW 152.
In plaintiff's complaint, after setting out the Notice,
and in paragraph 4 (R. 2), he alleges:
''That the claim set forth in said instrument
which was duly recorded as hereinabove set forth
was false and without right whatever ... "
Plaintiff has not set out in his complaint what w<;>rds
were false; neither has he denied that any of the words
set out were false. He merely alleges that the "claim"
set forth was false. This is not a denial of any slanderous words.
(C)

Malice.

There is not one act of malice set out in the complaint.
In par. 3 of the complaint (R. 1), plaintiff alleges
that on or about August 9, 1945, the defendant,
''falsely and maliciously and with intent to
encumber and cloud plaintiff's title to said lands,
and to harass and vex plaintiff in the quiet enjoyment thereof, caused to be recorded ... " the
Notice.
Futher, par. 6 (R. 3),
"that the acts of said defendant have been
actuated by malice, and that said defendant has
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been guilty of oppression and malice 1n his actions aforesaid . . . ''
Again, in par. 7 (R. 3)_,
"that by reason of said acts of malice and
oppression of defendant towards plaintiff as
hereinabove set forth plaintiff has suffered damage ... "
One searches the complaint in va1n for a single,
solitary act alleged on the part of the defendant, except
only "that he caused to be recorded" the Notice. All
other allegations are conclusions of a general nature
of what his intentions were, and not a solitary statement of any act on which to base such conclusions as
to his intentions.
Findings of malice required to support slander of title action, must be based on facts indicating its existence.-Briggs v. Coykendall, 224
N.W. 202, 57 N.D. 785.
A person is not liable in damages merely for
being unsuccessful in defending or asserting judicially what he believes to be his right.-Clark
v. Tensas Delta Land Co., 136 So. 1, 172 La. 913.
Malice or want of good faith and want of probable cause are essential elements of the action of
slander of title and damages cannot he recovered
where it appears that such element is absent and
the defendant is asserting a bona fide claim in
good faith though without right.-Ward v. MidWest & Gulf Co., 223 P. 170, 97 Okla. 252.
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Words spoken or written regarding property
or title are not actionable per se.-Briggs v. Coykendall, 224 N.W. 202, 57 N.D. 785.
Malice is a necessary ingredient to entitle
plaintiff to recover in an action for slander of
title and the action cannot be maintained if the
claim was asserted by defendant in good faith or
if the acts complained of were founded on probable cause or were so prompted by a reasonable
belief, although the statement may have been
false.-Local Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n. of
Oklahoma v. Sickles, 165 P. 2d 328.
Malice is a necessary ingredient of an action
for slander on title, and must be both alleged and
proven, since a claim of title asserted in good
faith will not constitute a basis for an action of
slander of title.-Waterhouse v. McPheeters, 145
S.W. 2d 766 (Tenn.).
Before liability on theory of "slander of title"
can be established the party accused must have
acted maliciously and the fact he had no claim,
itself does not establish malice since, if he only
had reasonable grounds to believe he had an
equity or legal title in the lands, assertion of his
claim could not be slander of title.-Allison v.
Berry, 44 N.E. 2d 929, 316 Ill. App. 261.
Filing or recording of an instrument such as
a lien is not actionable per se, but must be maliciously levied.-Gudger v. Manton, 123 P. 2d 635.
Defendant asserts that because the only act on the
part of the defendant set out in plaintiff's complaint,
that of recording the Notice, he has failed to allege
malice as required in an action for slander of title.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
The question of Malice will lw furthl·r diseu::;seJ
under Point 2.
POINT 2
THE COURT ERRED IX 0YERRULING PLAINTIFF'S
SPECIAL DEMURRER.

Defendant believes that the matters referred to in
par. 1 (R. 7) of his special demurrer are covered by his
general demurrer, so will pass to the second paragraph
of his special demurrer, viz:
"That said complaint is uncertain in that it
cannot be determined from paragraph 4 thereof
or said complaint what constitutes the 'claim'
which plaintiff alleges to be false and without
right." (R. 7).
As stated in Potso Zinc Co. v. Mahoney, 135 P. 1078,
36 Nev. 390, it must appear that the words complained
of were false. Defendant was entitled to know just what
was the ''claim'' which plaintiff alleged was false, since
he did not allege the falsity of any words. In alleging
that the above ''claim'' was false, did he mean that
Doris Trust Company falsely claimed residence at 1430
South ~lain Street, Salt Lake City, Utah; or that Addison Cain falsely claimed to be the President of Doris
Trust Company; or that the payment of $1,000.00 waR
a false claim; or that the lots mentinod were not in Fox's
Subdivision or not in Salt Lake City, Utah; or that they
\rere purchased for Doris Trust Company by S. W.
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Dowse; or that the payment of $1,000.00 was on the purchase price of the lots, etc~
Defendant alleges that the complaint was not certain as to the above matters and that par. 2 of his special
demurrer should have been sustained.
In his special demurrer (R. 7), the defendant set
forth, par. 4,
"That said complaint is uncertain in that it
cannot be determined therefrom what were the
acts of oppression and what were the acts of
malice on the part of the defendant, as alleged in
said complaint.''
:Malice being one of the essential elements of an
action for slander of title, it must be based on facts
indicating its existence. (Briggs v. Coykendall), heretofore referred to). No such basic facts appear in the complaint, and hence this paragraph of defendant's special
demurrer should have been sustained.
POINT 3 and POINT 4
THE CouRT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT's :MoTION

Fou

DISMISSAL oF THE CoMPLAINT; AND IN OvERRULING

DE-

FENDANT's OBJECTION TO TESTIMONY THEREUNDER.

(R. 50, 52).
Defendant based his motion and objection on his
contention that the complaint was fatally defective and
did not state a cause of action. The same argument~
apply here as are set out under defendant's POINT 1,
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and will therefore not be repeated, but referred to iu
support of the clain1ed error of the court hereunder.
As the matters hereinbefore discussed relate to the
pleadings, it is thought adYisable, before taking up the
remaining Points on which defendant relies for reversal
of the judgment, briefly to review the evidence in the
case, as it pertains to the four essential elements con:-tituting slander of title, i.e., (A) The vVords Published;
(B) Falsity of 'Vords Published; (C) :Maliciousness;
and (D) Special Damages.
THE
(A)

EYIDE~CE

As to TV ords Published.

Defendant admitted in his answer the filing of the
Notice.
There is no testimony in the record that the }Hing
of the Notice decreased the value of the property, or
thwarted any sale, or that anyone because of seeing it
on that account had refused to purchase the property.
Defendant further asserts that because the notice
"~as not acknowledged as required by law, referred to
hereinbefore in discussing this topic under POINT 1,
there was no publication.
(B)

Falsity of the Words Published.

While the plaintiff in his complaint has not alleged
that any of the words in the Notice were false, merely
alleging that,
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"That the claim set forth in said instrument
which was duly recorded as hereinbefore set forth
was false and without right whatever, and defendant at time of recording said instrument as
hereinabove set forth, had no estate, right, title
or interest whatever in or to or upon said land
. . . ."
or premises
it might be well to break down the Notice and call altention to the following:
(1) The words, "That One Thousand Dollars has been paid towards the purchase price .. ''
Defendant's Exhibit 2, a check for $1,000.00, dated
July 31, 1945, on the face of which was written ''First
on, Lot 13th So. and 1st \Vest St.'' payable to the order
of Selwin Dowse and endorsed ''Selwin Dowse'' '' S. W.
Dowse" was received in evidence. (R. 75).
Plaintiff testified that that check was received by
him and cashed by him, being the same $1,000.00 referred to in the Notice sued upon, paid to·wards the purchase price of the lots referred to; that it was paid; and
that that statement, "That One Thousand Dollars has
been paid towards the purchase price,'' was not a false
statement, (R. 73); and that he (plaintiff) was selling
the lots to him (defendant). (R. 74).
(2) The words, " ... and that the balance,
plus a reasonable commission will be paid on demand on delivery of deed.''
Plaintiff further testified, in response to questions,
(R. 74) as follows:
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Q. And the state1nent: "that the balane(~ plus
reasonable commission will be paid upon demand of the deed,'' is that correct 1
A. It is correct so far as if he had paid the
correct balance, I would have delivered the
deed to him, yes.
Q. If he had paid the balance owing you would
have been willing to give him the deed'?
A. Yes, certainly.
Q. So that part of the statement is all right'?
A. It is all right.
Q. So that isn't a false staten1ent '?
A. No.
(3) The words, "That certain property described as: All of Lots one to eleven in Fox's
Subdivision, an addition to Salt Lake City, Utah
-was purchased for Doris Trust Company by
S. W. Dowse, as their agent ... ''
The plaintiff testified that he had an agreement
with Doris Trust Company about the purchase of the
Lots 1 to 11 Fox's subdivision, that he was selling the
-property to him (meaning Doris Trust Company), under which agreement he was to pay the balance. (R.
73, 74).
On Redirect Examination, Mr. Dowse testified that
the above-quoted statement was untrue. (R. 78), meaning no doubt that part, the lots ''was purchased for Doris
Trust Company by S. W. Dow8e, as their agent" was
not true.
Everything else in the Notice is admitted by plaintiff to be true, except the statement,
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"was purchased for Doris Trust Company
by S. W. Dowse, as their agent."
It is apparent from the record that there was a
misunderstanding as to just what were the terms of
the deal or agreement between plaintiff and defendant
with respect to the sale and purchase of the lots in
question.
Plaintiff in par. 4 of his complaint (R. 2) alleges
that,
'' ... the defendant at the time of recording
said instrument as hereinabove set forth (Aug.
9, 1945) had no estate, right, title or interest
whatever in or to or upon said land or premises,
or any part thereof; ... ''
and yet he admits under oath on the witness stand
that he did have an agreement to sell the property to
the defendant and that the defendant had paid $1,000.00
thereon.
Mr. Addison Cain testified (R. 94) that he prepared
the Notice in question, and that when he filed it (Aug.
9, 1945) he put therein what at the time of filing he
believed to be the agreement between them, and he
believed the statements therein were true. (R. 95 ).
Plaintiff introducd in evidence his Exhibit C, a
letter dated August 20, 1945, from Doris Trust Company to plaintiff, in which appears the following: (R.
80, 81)
''Herewith we are returning your check for
One Thousand Dollars and notify you now in
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writing that we are tendering you the balance
of the Fifteen Hundred dollars you paid out for
us on the purchase price of Lots 1 to 11 Fox's
Subdivision together with the regular fee of 5%
$150. for your purchase, ... ''
The above Exhibit, written shortly after the check
payment, and the filing of the X otice, would seem to
corroborate defendant's contention as to what he considered to be the terms of the deal, at the time he filed
the Notice.

C. Malice.
Plaintiff testified that defendant agreed to pay
$2625 for the property, subject to delinquent taxes, and
agreed to pay $1,000 dovvn (R. 65); that he ordered a
tax search, that :Mr. Cain said the tax search \vas all
right and that he would come up and pay $500.00 rnore;
that he came back the same day and made demand to
give him the deed for $500.00 more (R. 66); that plaintiff refused to give the deed for $500.00 more, as that
was not the price agreed upon; that he (Mr. Cain) said
he would take me into court; if necessary, go to the
Supreme Court, and plaintiff advised him he was at
liberty to do so. (R. 67) ; that plaintiff thought he told
defendant at that time, if he didn't want it he would
give him his money back (R. 82); to which defendant
replied "nothing doing", he wanted the property and
he was going to get it. (R. 83).
Mrs. Dowse, wife of plaintiff, also testified that
she was present when :Mr. Cain came in and asked that
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they make out the deed while she was present and clos~
up the deal; that her husband replied "for the .first price
you agreed on first"; that Mr. Cain said, "no you only
paid $1500 for that property and that is all you are going to get out of me,-you are not going to make a profit
out of me"; that he further said that her husband only
paid $1500.00 for it and he would take him through the
Supreme Court if necessary to get that property for
that price (R. 86); that Mr. Dowse said he would give
him the $1,000.00 back and forget the whole thing, or
go through with it as originally agreed. (R. 87).
This evidence so far as it reflects defendant's attiture, supports defendant's contention that the deal was
on a commission basis, except as to plaintiff's statement
that he was to receive $2625.00 for the property, subject to the taxes.
Defendant affirms that there is no evidence introduced to show malice as an element of a slander of title
action. There was a deal pending between the parties;
defendant had paid $1,000.00 thereon; plaintiff alleges
that the defendant agreed to pay $2625 for the lots, subject to taxes. He further testified, however, that at the
time of making the deal with defendant, the lots had
been sold to Salt Lake County ten years prior, for delinquent taxes for 1933, (R. 76), and that he did not
get it until a year after the deal with defendant (R. 77);
that subsequent to July 18, (1945) he had to pay back
taxes, had to pay off sewer taxes, had to get a new abstract, and had to bring an action against Salt Lake
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County as they first rpfused to giYe him a tax deed, (R.
55); that he was prevented fr01n getting tax deed as OJH~
of the county eommissioners wanted the property himself. (R. 82).
:Jir. Cain testified that after paying the $1,000, there
were other conYersations; that plaintiff was trying to
get the ta..'ws adjusted and we couldn't close the deal
because he didn't get the amount of taxes ascertained
that he would have to pay to the county. (R. 94).
D.

Special Damages.

There is no evidence in the record showing or tending to show any special damages suffered by plaintiff.
POINT 5
THE CouRT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EviDENCE PLAINTIFF's

ExHIBIT

C. (R. 80, 81).

The Notice was filed August 9, 1945. Exhibit C,
later identified as C-1 and C-2 (R. 117) showed transactions subsequent to the filing of the Notice; Exhibit
C-2 being check dated August 17, 1945, which plaintiff
sent to Addison Cain, and C-1 a letter returning the
check to plain tiff.
These exhibits have no bearing on special damages,
publishing and uttering malicious words, the falsity of
published words, or malice alleged to have been exhibited
in filing the Notice.
It is impossible to determine what effect they had
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with the jury in its determining of exemplary damages;
or what weight the court gave to these exhibits in
granting plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict.
POINT 6
THE CouRT ERRED IN REFUSING DEFENDANT's MoTION
FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT. (R. 117).
Defendant asserts that defendant's motion for a
directed verdict should have been granted both on the
law and on the evidence: on the law for the reasons
hereinbefore set forth under Point 1; and on the evidence, as follows :
All of the- statements in the Notice were admitted
or evidence given in support thereof, except that defendant testified the statement, that the property was
purchased for the Doris Trust Company by S. \V. Dowse
as their agent, was untrue.
One Thousand dollars had been paid towards the
purchase price (R. 75); the parties had entered into
some agreement for the sale and purchase, (R. 73, 74);
the deal was still pending when the Notice was filed, as
indicated by Exhibit C. (R. 81); the court made findings
in the former case to the effect that there was an oral
agreement, with insufficient memoranda in writing to
make it enforceable, Def's. Exhibit 4 (R. 89, 92), in
which it also found that on May 11, 1946, defendant
made a demand on the plaintiff for the refund or repayment of the $1,000.00 paid on the agreement; that plainSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tiff refused to pay the san1e or any part thereof; and
that as of February ~8. 1947, the plaintiff was the
owner as against defendant, and that defendant then
had no right, title or interest therein; that defendant
was entitled to repayment of the $1,000.00, \dth interest
from "J[ay 11, 1946 (date of demand for repayment)
and that "each party shall bear his own costs."

POINT 7
THE CouRT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF's l\IoTION FOR

A DIRECTED VERDICT.

(R. 107).

Defendant asserts that in view that the complaint
was fatally defective, as set out in his discussion under
Point 1, it was error to grant the motion.
Further, there was no evidence received showing
special damages; all of the statements in the Notice were
admitted to be true by plaintiff, except as to a min::>r
statement therein which plaintiff testified was untrue;
there was no evidence of malice as a basis for a slander
of title action.
In granting the motion for a directed verdict, the
court made the following statement:
"Well, I shall grant the motion of the plaintiff for directed verdict, that means a verdict in
what sum do you contend~"
To which .J[r. Backman, one of the attorneys for the
plaintiff, replied,
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''Well, we contend we have shown the damages of $250. which was the amount incurred by
the plaintiff in clearing his title." (R. 108).
Defendant affirms that the granting of the motion
for directed verdict in view of that admission by counsel,
to the effect that the alleged damage of $250. was the
amount incurred by the plaintiff in clearing his title,
was error.
Calling attention again to defendant's Exhibit 4 (R.
89, 92), based on its Findings of Fact therein, the court
in its Conclusions of Law held, that each party shall
bear his own costs.
Now to grant the plaintiff $250.00, the amount incurred by him in clearing his title, when the court refused to grant him any costs in the case where he alleges he paid the $250.00, would he a most unusual procedure; and would constitute a collateral attack on the
prior judgment.
POINT 8
THE CouRT ERRED IN SuBMITTING THE QuESTION OF
AMOUNT OF EXEMPLARY DAMAGES TO THE JURY.

(R. 113).

Under Point 1, subheading (C), defendant has called
attention to Malice as it applies to actions for slander
of title.
Without showing malice, one cannot prevail in such
an action, to obtain special damages suffered. In other
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words, in the instant case, plaintiff would haYe to prove
malice even to obtain special dmnages.
If he has proven such Inalice as "Tould warrant the
'verdict for the special dan1ages alleged, then it would
appear that defendant would have to be guilty of
"super" malice in order to justify the court in submitting the question of exemplary damages to the jury;
it would have to be "malice on malice".
To justify recovery of "exemplary damages",
act causing injury must be done with evil intent
and purpose of injuring plaintiff, or with such
wanton and reckless disregard of his rights as
evidences wrongful motive.-Calhown v. Universal Credit Co. et al, 106 Utah 166, 146 P. 2d 284.
Defendant asserts that there is no evidence in the
record whatever to warrant submitting to the jury the
question of amount of such damages.
Further, that in an action for slander of title only
special damages are recoverable.
POINT 9
THE CouRT ERRED WITH RESPECT TO EAcH PoRTION OF

INSTRUCTION No.

1

As GIVEN To THE JuRY (R.

113-114)

AND TO WHICH DEFENDANT NOTED AN ExcEPTION.

(R. 117).

The Court erred in its first paragraph of Instruction No. 1, wherein the jury was directed to find the
issues in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.
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No special damages having been shown or proved,
this instruction should not have been given.
The court erred in its second paragraph of Instruction No. 1, wherein it stated that compensatory damages
are damages awarded for injuries actually sustained
resulting from an act by a person against whom the
issues are found, in this case against the defendant, for·
the reason that compensatory damages are not recoverable in an action for slander of title.
The court erred in its third paragraph of Instruction No. 1, wherein it directed the jury to fix the amount
of plaintiff's compensatory damages, that is the amount
shown by the evidence, for the reason that only special
damages and not compensatory damages are recoverable.
The court erred in its fifth paragraph, and also to
all of paragraph 6 of Instruction No. 1.
POINT 10
THE CouRT ERRED IN FAILING TO CHARGE THE JURY As
SET FoRTH IN EAcH OF DEFENDANT's REQUESTED
INSTRUCTIONS

N 0. 1 ·TO 5,

INCLUSIVE.

( R.

35-39).

The record does not show that defendant took exceptions to the court's failure to instruct the jury as
requested.
The record in this case does not indicate that another trial might disclose new facts or improve or
change plaintiff's proof of his claimed cause of action.
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\Y e contend that the judgment appealed from should

be reYersed and that entry of judgment for defendant
should be ordered.
Respectfully submitted,

DAVID A. WEST,
Attorney for Defendant
and Appellant.
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